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 Page 2 of 30 I. Task 
Book II of the Social Code (SGB II) entered into force on 1 January 2005. This legislation 
merged Germany's unemployment assistance system and social assistance system which 
had existed parallel to one another up to that date to create basic security benefits for job 
seekers, a system to aid unemployed individuals who are capable of earning a living and are 
in need of assistance. The Federal Employment Agency and Germany's autonomous 
municipalities and districts (local providers) were designated as providers of basic security 
benefits pursuant to Section 6 of SGB II. Joint Agencies were set up on a regular basis 
pursuant to Section 44b of SGB II. In derogation of this, Section 6a of SGB II opens up for a 
limited number of municipalities and a limited period of time the option of administering basic 
security benefits themselves. As a result, local providers can take over the duties of local 
employment agencies and thus act as sole providers of basic security benefits. Section 6c of 
SGB II tasks the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs with examining and comparing 
the performance of the different providers of basic security benefits for job seekers. This 
provision stipulates that Germany's state governments are to be involved in the development 
of the approaches and methods to be used for the study and in the analysis of the findings. 
This was accomplished by setting up a working group whose members included 
representatives of the individual states as well as representatives of the Federal Employment 
Agency, the Institute for Employment Research, the Confederation of German Employers' 
Associations, the German Trade Union Confederation, and the three municipal umbrella 
organisations Association of German Counties, German Association of Cities and Towns and 
German Association of Towns and Municipalities. This group discussed in broad consensus 
the research design, the research questions used in the awarding of individual research 
contracts, current interim results and the final reports submitted by the research consortia. 
Pursuant to Section 6c of SGB II, only the states were to be involved in the drafting of this 
final report which the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was then to submit to the 
legislative bodies of the Federal Government. During a two-day workshop, the state 
representatives received the opportunity to ask researchers about the results of their work, 
and the methods and data base used. In addition, a synopsis of the results (which had a 
significant influence on this summary report) was presented and discussed in a first round of 
talks. The states' comments regarding the draft submitted by the Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs were discussed in depth during a second round. This led to numerous 
changes in the draft which were primarily aimed at making the presentation of the results 
easier to understand. In addition, the states were also given an opportunity to comment on 
the final report which was drawn up on this basis. The states' comments can be found in 
Annex 2. 
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the following consortia by means of tender: (1) Institute for Applied Economic Research 
(Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung e.V. - IAW) Tübingen, Centre for European 
Economic Research (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung - ZEW) Mannheim, (2) 
Institute for Urban and Regional Development of the Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences 
(Institut für Stadt- und Regionalentwicklung der Fachhochschule Frankfurt a. M. - ISR), the 
infas Institute for Applied Social Science (Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft GmbH - 
infas) Bonn, the Institute for Labour Market Research and Occupational Guidance for Youths 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarktforschung und Jugendberufshilfe - IAJ) Oldenburg, the Social 
Science Research Center Berlin (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin - WZB), Simma & Partner 
Consulting GmbH Bregenz, (3) the Centre for European Economic Research (Zentrum für 
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH - ZEW) Mannheim, the Institute for Work, Skills 
and Training (Institut für Arbeit und Qualifikation - IAQ) of the University of Duisburg-Essen, 
TNS Emnid Bielefeld, (4) the ifo Institute for Economic Research (ifo Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung e.V.) Munich and the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Institut 
für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung e.V. - IAW) Tübingen.  
II. Subject and design of the study 
The evaluation had the aim of observing the implementation of SGB II by the different 
provider models during the experimental phase with respect to the integration of job seekers, 
analysing the effects of these models and elaborating the reasons for the differences in their 
performance. The term 'provider model' refers to the two different types of providers of basic 
security benefits for job seekers at the local bodies responsible for basic security benefits 
which can be tasked pursuant to Sections 6 and 6a of SGB II with implementing SGB II 
during the experimental phase, namely: Joint Agencies which consist of a local employment 
agency together with the respective municipality and Approved Local Providers which are the 
bodies through which the municipalities discharge these duties on their own. In those cases 
where a Joint Agency is not set up, SGB II will be executed in separate parts by the local 
employment agency and municipality which then discharge different tasks (Separate 
Providers).  
In simplified terms, the evaluation of Section 6c of SGB II had the task of answering the 
question: Who can do the job better and why? The two models were compared on the basis 
of criteria derived from the tasks and aims of the provision of basic security benefits for job 
seekers. According to Section 1 of SGB II, eliminating or reducing the need for assistance 
through the assumption of employment is the general objective behind the provision of basic 
security benefits for job seekers. Further, basic security benefits are intended to help 
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this connection, the equality of men and women is to be pursued as a general principle and 
gender-specific disadvantages to persons who are capable of earning a living and are in 
need of assistance are to be counteracted. The particular circumstances of persons who 
raise children or take care of infirm relatives are to be taken into consideration and 
disadvantages that are specific to disabled persons are to be eliminated. 
As members of the working group, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the 
state governments, municipal umbrella associations and the Federal Employment Agency 
developed the following three indicators on the basis of the general aims of the SGB II 
mentioned above. These indicators were developed to measure the effect of the provider 
models as part of the evaluation to be conducted pursuant to Section 6c of SGB II: 
(1) Integration into gainful employment  
(2) Maintain or improve employability  
(3) Social stabilisation 
The choice of the indicator 'integration into gainful employment' makes it clear that for the 
purposes of the evaluation not only 'integration into employment that meets the individual's 
financial needs' but also 'integration into employment that does not meet the individual's 
financial needs' and employment that is subsidised through an integration bonus or other 
types of wage-related subsidies are counted as meeting this objective. All four of these forms 
of integration – in addition to the overall indicator 'integration into gainful employment' – were 
to be reported separately in connection with the effects had by the two provider models. The 
intention behind having the indicators jointly defined by the Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs together with the state governments, municipal umbrella organisations and the 
Federal Employment Agency was to avoid letting opportunities for integrating individuals into 
gainful employment during the period under study with the help of funding instruments or 
supplementary benefits go unused simply because they would not included in this indicator in 
the evaluation. The order of the goals was not chosen by chance. Maintenance or 
improvement of employability and social stabilisation aim at eliminating or reducing the need 
for assistance by preparing the individual for his/her integration into gainful employment. 
During the discussions of the approach and methods to be used in the evaluation, the states 
and the municipal umbrella organisations in particular said that emphasis on the goal of 
integrating job seekers into gainful employment should not be so great that the other goals 
targeted by the provision of basic security benefits for job seekers are neglected. The 
fundamental overall objectives of SGB II according to Section 1 (1) are to strengthen the 
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earn a living by their own means and efforts independently of basic security benefits." 
Correspondingly, the elimination or reduction of the need for assistance should also be 
reflected in the evaluation's objectives without a closer connection with integration into the 
labour market. The following statement was therefore appended to the above set of 
objectives: "The cancellation of registration for benefits because recourse is being taken to 
other sources of income is to be taken into account throughout the studies but is not 
understood here as a separate labour market policy objective." The report accordingly shows 
the effect that the provider models have on the outflow from the need for assistance all in all. 
The reduction in the need for assistance was measured using the 'integration into 
employment that does not meet the individual's financial needs' indicator and is additionally 
reflected in the calculation of the model's financial impact at aggregate level. 
All participants were agreed from the start that the strengthening of the personal 
responsibility of employable persons who are in need of assistance and/or the intermediate 
steps toward this were to be measured separately using the objectives 'maintain or improve 
employability' and 'social stabilisation'. In the course of the studies, the latter objective was 
integrated into the indicator 'employability' in agreement with the states, municipal umbrella 
organisations and the Federal Employment Agency because it could not be operationalised 
as a separate objective. In the case of the objective 'employability', the task was to find a 
method for grouping together into one indicator certain aspects (to be ascertained from the 
individuals) of employability such as training, health, mobility and motivation which have 
been proven to go hand-in-hand with an increased probability of integration. The intention 
here was to find an operationalisation of employability that goes beyond the usually 
customary plausibility considerations.  
Attention was paid to the principles of gender mainstreaming throughout the process of 
assessing the achievement of these objectives and, in addition to this, the specific groups 
targeted by SGB II were taken into consideration.  
In view of the many variants for the administrative implementation of SGB II by the bodies 
responsible for basic security benefits for job seekers, the evaluation was also concerned 
with describing and typifying this diversity and with analysing the effects had by the different 
types of organisation, activation strategies and measures. Explanations were to be found on 
the basis of these findings for why a particular provider model is efficient or not. In this 
respect the evaluation process was also understood as an opportunity for identifying good 
practices from the different implementation strategies regardless of the particular provider 
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responsible for basic security benefits in their search for the best solutions. 
It was therefore agreed in conjunction with the states, municipal umbrella organisations and 
the Federal Employment Agency to specify the content of Section 6a of SGB II (Experiment 
Clause) with its wording "testing ... alternative models for the integration of job seekers" in 
such a way for the research task that it would be possible to examine the respective design 
and efficiency of the entire activation process of the provider models on a comparative basis. 
The term 'entire activation process' refers to the organisational structures, the activation 
strategies and the use of measures. The aim here was to get away from the fixation on 
instruments seen in past evaluations and develop a research concept that would be suitable 
for the task of assessing a 'competition' between different institutions.  
The use of measures is understood in this connection as one rather than the sole means of 
labour market intervention. This also applies to so-called (other) further benefits which 
opened up the opportunity for both provider models to test innovative and tailor-made 
funding concepts. Insofar as this succeeded and the corresponding effect emerged, the use 
of so-called (other) further benefits is reflected in the overall results. Consequently, in the 
event that one provider model functioned more successfully using this type of measure in 
comparison to the other model, this information flowed into the results of the performance 
comparison (in any event into the respective global model effect) and is additionally to be 
found in the general measure categories and the total expenditure for integration benefits. 
On the other hand, due to problems involved in gathering statistics, it was not possible to 
evaluate the effect individual (other) further benefits have on the success of the individual 
provider model. This also however applies to a number of other assistance instruments. Only 
special subsidised employment arrangements, training measures and continuing training 
lasting less than three months could be specially evaluated. These three types however 
represent the majority of measures used in the provision of basic security benefits for job 
seekers. 
Looking at the results outlined here, it is evident that the key factors for success are to be 
found in the organisational structure, the choice of labour market strategy and the way the 
activation process is organised. In light of this, the evaluation working group's interpretation 
of the subject of the study proved to be a very sensible one. According to the analyses 
presented here, measures had very little or no isolated effect during the period under study, 
especially when – as it turned out – the process used to assign participants to measures is 
inexact and does not make use of effect potential. With this in mind, the evaluation 
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narrower mandate for examining this institutional 'competition'. 
The description of the implementation of the provision of basic security benefits explores not 
only the internal organisational structures and activation strategies but also the governance 
and management relationships of the bodies that are responsible for basic security benefits 
(governance and implementation analysis). Executive management personnel were asked 
questions on this by e-mail as part of a so-called organisation survey. Interviews with experts 
and detailed case studies were additionally conducted. These were based on document 
analyses, interviews, non-participatory observation and focus group interviews in a sample of 
154 bodies responsible for basic security benefits. This sample was comprised of 97 Joint 
Agencies, 51 Approved Local Providers and six Separate Providers.  
The impact that the provider models had on the above objective indicators was analysed on 
two levels: (1) at the individual level (micro-analysis) and (2) the aggregate level (macro-
analysis). The key question in the micro-level analysis was: In which of the two provider 
models do individuals have a better chance of ending their need for assistance, becoming 
integrated into gainful employment or improving their employability? The corresponding 
question for the analysis at macro-level was: Which of the two provider models leads 
nationwide to greater outflows from the need for assistance, more transfers to employment or 
greater improvements in employability? In contrast to the micro-level, it was possible at 
macro-level to take into account commuting patterns, displacement processes (subsidised 
enterprises displacing unsubsidised enterprises) and substitution processes (subsidised 
employees taking the place of unsubsidised employees). 
At methodological level, steps had to be taken to ensure that only comparable bodies that 
are responsible for basic security benefits were compared in the impact analysis. The 
reason: In the event that a particular provider model was systematically chosen more 
frequently in regions with favourable conditions or a more advantageous client structure than 
the other model, there would be the risk in a simple comparison that the performance posted 
by the provider model with the more favourable conditions appears to be better than it 
actually is. In such a case, the success of a particular body responsible for basic security 
benefits with a good situation or advantageous client structure could not be attributed solely 
to the particular provider model but would rather also have to be attributed to the fact that it 
had more favourable conditions. The effects of beneficial factors such as these therefore had 
to be stripped out with the help of statistical methods so that it would be possible to conduct 
a fair assessment of the different provider models. 
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accomplished in the micro-analyses using a so-called matching process in which only similar 
individuals in regions with similar labour market conditions were compared with one another. 
The first step consisted of 'region matching', a process in which each region with an 
Approved Local Provider is matched with a comparable region that is as similar as possible 
and has a Joint Agency. In the second step, the client structures in the samples of these 'twin 
regions' were balanced out against one another in such as way that for every individual in the 
sample of one region there is a 'statistical twin' in the other region. Statistical twins were to be 
similar to one another, particularly with regard to personal attributes that are of central 
importance for integration into gainful employment. Statistical twins were matched up on the 
basis of individual attributes that are documented in the Federal Employment Agency's 
process data. In this way it was possible to ensure that the statistical twins were identical in 
terms of socio-demographic attributes such as education levels, gender and age. Based on 
our present body of knowledge, it is not enough to take only these types of attributes into 
account because it can be assumed that other attributes which cannot be measured directly 
– such as a person's level of motivation – are also relevant to successful integration. A 
proven method from the evaluation research field was used to ensure that bodies 
responsible for basic security benefits which had highly motivated clients were not compared 
with counterparts with less motivated clients and thus run the risk of attributing the 
consequent differences to the particular provider model. Using this method, the individual's 
employment biography which had been documented in the process data was taken into 
account when selecting sets of twins. In the case of former social assistance recipients who 
were not listed in the process data, the required information was acquired by means of a 
survey. This procedure was based on the assumption that the fundamental level of 
motivation is similar in persons with a similar employment biography. It is still possible that 
differences existed in a few relevant attributes in statistical twins who were matched up this 
way. However this did not pose a problem because it is not plausible that differences 
between statistical twins that remain after the matching procedure are systematically 
assigned to just one of the provider models. 
A different statistical procedure was used in the macro-analysis to establish comparability. 
Regression analyses with selection controls were conducted which – like the matching 
procedure – made it possible to calculate the individual effects had by the particular provider 
model, in other words, without biasing variables. Biasing variables can be stripped out in this 
connection even when no data is available on them, in other words, even when they are not 
observable. This was done with the help of a third observable and measurable attribute – a 
so-called instrument – which had an influence on the local decision-makers' choice of 
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the particular provider model can then be measured independently of the biasing variables 
by means of the chain reaction of the instrument's influences via the provider model variable 
on the outcome variable. 
The impact analysis used process-generated data from the Federal Employment Agency and 
data from a client survey conducted by the 154 bodies responsible for basic security benefits 
from the above-mentioned sample. Using the client survey it was possible to develop 
detailed personal profiles which were used, for example, to measure client employability. The 
micro-analysis was based on this client survey and used some 6,000 to 9,000 observations 
for its comparison of the provider models. The size of the sample in relation to the parent 
population was in line with the proportions seen in other surveys such as the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study, the Income and Expenditure Survey and the European Union Labour 
Force Survey. In contrast to the micro-analysis, it was possible to take all bodies responsible 
for basic security benefits into account in the macro-analysis, with the exception of the 
employability analyses. The process data from the Approved Local Providers did not contain 
information on transitions to employment. Since this information was necessary for the 
macro-analysis it had to be reconstructed by comparing the data from employment statistics, 
unemployment statistics, statistics on the provision of basic security benefits and statistics on 
assistance measures. The data stock was augmented by contextual indicators from other 
data sources regarding the demographic, economic and infrastructure conditions and by 
indicators from the organisation survey.  
The period under investigation extended from 2005 to early 2008. The central impact 
analyses concentrate on the years 2006 and 2007. As a result, the findings from the impact 
analysis come from a rather small time window. This places limits on statements that can be 
made regarding the sustainability of the observed integration and on the effects of increased 
employability. Unless otherwise stated, the most current available figures were used. 
Only the organisation survey and the implementation and governance analysis could take the 
separate discharge of SGB II duties by the employment agencies and local authorities 
(Separate Providers) completely into account. Findings regarding their effect are available 
only to a very limited degree because of the small number of bodies that are responsible for 
basic security benefits and discharge these duties separately on the basis of a division of 
tasks. 
As a result of the matching procedure used at micro-level in the impact analyses, it was not 
possible to include Joint Agencies in large cities with more than 250,000 residents in the 
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large cities that could serve as twin regions. 
In keeping with current scientific standards, the use of the above-described procedures at 
micro- and macro-level ensured that the measured differences between the provider models 
can be interpreted causally. In other words, the respective provider model is the reason for 
the differences in effect levels and these differences cannot be attributed to the differences in 
the conditions or client structures at the provider models. 
III. Governance and implementation 
The provider models exhibit different degrees of variety in their governance structures and 
implementation strategies. At the same time, the provider models are shaped to a large 
degree by the respective governance structures which allow the executive management 
personnel at the respective provider to exercise its discretion at local level in various areas 
within the context of the respective type of management system. The implementation studies 
show that the process of managing and supervising persons who are capable of earning a 
living and in need of assistance is in part more differentiated among the providers belonging 
to a particular provider model than it is on average between the different provider models. In 
the case of activation and intervention strategies, the provider models do not exhibit any 
sizable differences. 
Governance 
In the case of supra-regional governance, federal institutions (Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs, Federal Employment Agency, Federal Court of Audit), state institutions (state 
ministries) and municipal umbrella organisations (Association of German Counties, German 
Association of Cities and Towns, German Association of Towns and Municipalities) play an 
important role in the work of the bodies responsible for basic security benefits. In this 
connection the different supervisory and control rights are crucial to the question of which 
federal level and institution may control the respective provider model and the degree to 
which it may exercise this control.  
The federal government is the central player in the implementation of SGB II. On the one 
hand, the federal level is the primary funder of basic security benefits for job seekers and 
assumed approximately 78% (€35.5 billion) of the total costs of SGB II in 2007. On the other 
hand, it is also the most important steering actor and determines the fundamental 
governance structures in its capacity as lawmaker and as the authority on the legality of legal 
actions and the supervising authority for the local employment agencies in Joint Agencies 
and Separate Providers and through administrative regulations. Working in consultation with 
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Agency is active in the development of organisational and process-related specifications and 
requirements. The Federal Court of Audit is the federal agency that audits the budget 
management and business management of all provider models with respect to those tasks 
that fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government in connection with the provision of 
basic security benefits for job seekers.  
The states usually exercise supervision at a lower level using consultations and supervisory 
meetings. However they call for reports and conduct audits relatively often. The states use 
orders, directions and formal objections seldomly, usually in connection with specific events 
in the individual body that is responsible for basic security benefits or in conjunction with 
framing this supervision in state legislation as supervision on the legality of legal actions and 
specialist supervision on specific subjects.   
On the municipal side, the Association of German Counties, the German Association of 
Cities and Towns and the German Association of Towns and Municipalities actively support 
the implementation of SGB II. In this connection, the Association of German Counties plays a 
leading role in the dissemination of information for the Approved Local Authorities. The 
municipal umbrella organisations are important for the Joint Agencies. By contrast, 
associations are of little significance to the Separate Providers.  
The local governance exhibits a varied picture of relevant actors: political parties, chambers, 
churches, unions, charitable organisations and even local businesses influence the activities 
of the bodies responsible for basic security benefits. In this connection, the management 
patterns at local level are more differentiated among the Joint Agencies than among the 
Approved Local Providers due to the larger number of players involved in the Joint Agencies. 
Collaboration with the above-mentioned actors differed according to the provider model. For 
example, during the first years following the introduction of SGB II the Approved Local 
Providers were confronted more frequently with influence being exerted by political parties 
than comparable Joint Agencies were. The Approved Local Providers generally pursued co-
operation with local economic development offices right from the start whereas many Joint 
Agencies developed this collaboration only as time went on. 
Structures and operational management 
Approved Local Providers exhibit decentralised structures which, in the opinion of their 
personnel, allow them greater discretionary powers and flexibility in their actions but at the 
same time offer the disadvantage of less transparency along the lines of supra-regional or 
nationwide monitoring or performance auditing. Due to their more complex internal 
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stakeholders in order to be able to conduct operations is greater among Joint Agencies than 
among Approved Local Providers. However the higher degree of regulation in the Joint 
Agency model is also due to the supervision and control that is exercised through the 
governance of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Federal Employment 
Agency. 
The Joint Agencies and Separate Providers have structural advantages along the interfaces 
with, for example, SGB III and SGB IX. In this area they can usually profit from their physical 
proximity and from special standardised IT software which their employees can access 
nationwide. As a result, Joint Agencies and Separate Providers are better able than 
Approved Local Providers to offer 'one-stop services' for the 'interface' areas: long-term 
unemployed individuals under 25 years of age ('U25'), persons undergoing rehabilitation, 
SGB III supplemental benefit recipients and employer services.  
For management by objectives and performance measurement, the Joint Agencies usually 
have federal objectives put in place locally by provider assemblies. These are often 
augmented by 'soft' process-related objectives (such as the quality of benefits processing, of 
case documentation or of integration agreements, maintenance of the data stock). 
Performance is measured using reports that are centrally released through the Federal 
Employment Agency. Approved Local Providers have no functional equivalent to the 
instrument of supra-regional management seen at the Joint Agencies and Separate 
Providers. Instead, operational management takes place at local level. Target agreements 
are concluded with top administrative levels or the political representatives of the particular 
municipality.  
Organisation of client management  
In order to systematise organisational differences, organisational types of client management 
were set up in all bodies responsible for basic security benefits on the basis of the 
organisation survey. These types of client management are different combinations of the 
three key features of how client management is organised: Bodies that are responsible for 
basic security benefits were divided into those where case management is conducted only 
for certain cases and is provided by personnel that the organisational structure specifically 
foresees for case management only (so-called specialised case management) and those 
bodies that use all their personnel for case management (in addition to other types of 
service) which is then provided for all or perhaps only a portion of their clients (so-called 
generalised case management). Looking at this criterion for differentiation, there were major 
differences between the provider models. During the organisation survey in 2007, 77% of the 
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Separate Providers said that their organisations pursued a specialised case management 
approach. By contrast, an overwhelming majority – 81% – of the Approved Local Providers 
stated that they practised a generalised case management approach. 
The respondents were then asked whether their case managers were also responsible for 
directly placing job-seekers in the general labour market. Approximately two-thirds of all 
bodies responsible for basic security benefits said that they integrated the task of placing job 
seekers into the general labour market into the respective type of case management they 
practised. No substantial differences could be observed between provider models in this 
connection. 
Lastly, the survey examined the question of whether the personnel who were responsible for 
case management or integration benefits were also the points of contact regarding basic 
security benefits. Specialisation in the processing of benefits (the person responsible for 
case management or integration benefits is not the point of contact for the processing of 
benefits) is unequivocally the dominant model. According to the information provided by 
executive management personnel, a total of 93% of all bodies responsible for basic security 
benefits use this method. Noticeably more Approved Local Providers (17%) than Joint 
Agencies (6%) indicated that they practised the integrated model. The Separate Providers 
did not use the integrated approach. 
Personnel  
All provider models hired personnel for fixed periods of time, whereby Approved Local 
Providers had much larger shares of temporary employees in all areas of activity than 
comparative Joint Agencies did. However, their temporary contracts run for longer terms and 
they have noticeably less staff fluctuation. In contrast to the Joint Agencies which drew their 
personnel in part from the core staffs of the Federal Employment Agency and the respective 
local welfare office, the Approved Local Providers recruited large shares of their personnel 
on the labour market. 
The training profiles of the guidance specialists (both temporary and permanent staff) in all 
provider models can be divided into persons with pedagogical training, persons with 
administrative training and persons with other vocational qualifications, which particularly 
include commercial qualifications. At 47%, the share of employees with pedagogical training 
out of all the specialists surveyed at the 51 Approved Local Providers in the sample of the 
154 bodies that are responsible for basic security benefits was particularly large, while the 
share of employees with administrative training / an administrative degree was small at 17%. 
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specialists have administrative training / an administrative degree, 18% have pedagogical 
training / a degree in education and at the Separate Providers where 44% have 
administrative training / an administrative degree and 25% pedagogical training / a degree in 
education. 
Executive management personnel at Joint Agencies has the problem that it has only a limited 
right to issue instructions to employees because the staff at Joint Agencies have different 
employers – either a local provider or local employment agency. This structure makes it 
difficult to transmit instructions to personnel and results in a certain administrative 
cumbersomeness. 
IT structures and specialised software 
All Joint Agencies share the same administrative structure. Consequently, they also have the 
same EDP structure nationwide – and concomitant nationwide data availability – for both 
case management and benefits processing. However this situation also means that EDP 
problems frequently take on a national scale, as has been the case with the special A2LL 
software for managing Unemployment Benefit II matters. 
By contrast, Approved Local Providers are decentralised and consequently work with 
different software programmes. Some have local EDP solutions that were specially 
developed for them. This variety of EDP programmes is due primarily to the fact that this 
specialised software is embedded into the system that the particular municipality uses for 
executing its budget. It furthermore facilitated the switch from the social assistance system to 
the system of basic security benefits for job seekers. It does however hinder the cross-
regional comparison of data. 
Activation and placement strategies 
Different areas of focus can be observed in how the individual provider models organise the 
activation process. The nationwide organisation survey suggests that more initial interviews 
are held at Joint Agencies than at Approved Local Providers within the first two weeks 
following approval of an individual's application. However, the initial interviews last longer on 
average at the Approved Local Providers. Joint Agencies also appear to stand out in 
connection with the activation of their clientele because they provide 'short-notice offers' 
more quickly than Approved Local Providers do and impose sanctions more often. All in all, 
this indicates that the Joint Agencies pursued an activation strategy during the period under 
review that was geared more to requiring action on the part of job seekers.   
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client segmentation. The Joint Agencies and Separate Providers base these segments on 
the Federal Employment Agency's service levels. By contrast, the Approved Local Providers 
do not have a segmentation concept that is applicable nationwide. It turns out that client 
segmentation supports the work of employees at Approved Local Providers better than it 
supports the work of staff members at Joint Agencies and Separate Providers. The latter 
workers even feel themselves to be burdened by the additional amount of work involved and 
the inflexible concept, which is why the personnel here tends to be critical in its assessment 
of the client management levels. 
As a rule, Joint Agencies and Separate Providers offer job-oriented placement services, 
using a joint employer service with the local employment agency for this. Applicant-oriented 
placement is much less seldom. This is in contrast to the Approved Local Providers which 
generally give priority to applicant-oriented placement and usually do not hold more jobs 
available than they currently need for their clientele. Specialists at the Joint Agencies who 
have a municipal employer more frequently pursue a case management strategy that 
revolves around profiling. By contrast, specialists who have the Federal Employment Agency 
as an employer tend to pursue a labour market strategy that gives centre stage to the job 
search and integration agreements. 
Equality of opportunity for men and women  
The subject of equal opportunity or gender mainstreaming generally appears to be of 
secondary importance in the hierarchy of the strategic objectives pursued by the bodies 
responsible for basic security benefits. There is little to indicate that this objective has gained 
in importance over the course of time. The SGB II's broader requirement of anchoring 
equality of opportunity as a paramount objective is not reflected at the level of the bodies 
responsible for basic security benefits. It can be said that agencies with Separate Providers 
tend to attach greater importance to the objective of establishing equality of opportunity than 
Approved Local Providers or Joint Agencies do. 
Over the course of time however, all provider models were able to make noticeable progress 
in anchoring gender mainstreaming at personnel level. The institutionalisation of gender 
mainstreaming is above average at Approved Local Providers and Separate Providers. 
However, special gender equality officers were set up in the bodies responsible for basic 
security benefits only in isolated cases, irrespective of the type of provider model. In fact, the 
most frequently used method for anchoring gender mainstreaming at personnel level is to 
assign existing positions – at and outside the respective body responsible for basic security 
benefits – the additional task of anchoring gender mainstreaming at the particular body.  
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responsibility for implementing gender mainstreaming, they have little de facto 'authority' in 
terms of participating in decisions on business policy or the use of measures and other 
similar issues – regardless of the provider model. The likelihood that gender mainstreaming 
officers are actively involved in decision-making processes is greatest at Approved Local 
Providers and Separate Providers. All in all, the respective executive management personnel 
also feels there is room for improvement in the level of implementation of gender 
mainstreaming achieved to date at the bodies responsible for basic security benefits. 
Conclusion 
The structural differences between the provider models can be described as follows: 
• The pattern seen at Approved Local Providers consists of greater regional diversity 
with less uniformity and standardisation in the discharge of their duties, combined 
with less systemic comparability of the methods and procedures used and greater 
local autonomy. This pattern retains the organisational traditions from the welfare 
offices.  
• The pattern observed at Joint Agencies exhibits a greater degree of uniformity and 
standardisation in the discharge of their duties across the regions, combined with 
greater systemic comparability of the methods and procedures used, plus marked 
limitations on local autonomy. The already-known organisational elements of the 
labour administration are operative in this pattern. 
IV. The activation process and use of measures at individual level 
The studies generally show that in terms of the actual activation process the provider models 
have grown more similar to one another over time. This can be observed in, for example, 
integration agreements and sanctions. Apart from this, the data from the client survey show – 
irrespective of the provider model – no fundamental changes in the intensity or direction of 
activation activities between 2006 and 2007. This is surprising because a higher degree of 
activation was actually expected in light of progress made on the learning curve, growing 
experience and the elimination of personnel bottlenecks over the course of time. Counselling 
interviews constituted the only exception. They have become more complex and appear to 
be somewhat more strongly geared to the living situation of the respective individual who is 
drawing benefits.  
On the basis of the client survey, it can be said all in all that a few types of measures 
predominate. These include, first and foremost, application coaching, internships and – 
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special subsidised work arrangements (such as 'one-euro jobs'). A comparison of the 
provider models reveals little difference in their use of different measures. 
Looking at the group of persons who are in need of assistance and are capable of earning a 
living, a breakdown of the findings from the client survey – by age, sex, disability, immigrant 
background and attributes of the respective household in which the jobless person lives – 
and disregarding the type of provider model – reveals rather little difference in the intensity or 
direction of the activation. Target group-specific differences were most likely to be seen in 
the number of integration agreements that had been signed at the time of the first survey.  
At the same time, the pattern of deviation among women was much different than the pattern 
seen among men. A below-average portion of women under the age of 25 and an above-
average portion of women over the age of 50 signed integration agreements. This pattern is 
just the reverse among men. An above-average number of women with an immigrant 
background and a below-average number of men with an immigrant background sign 
integration agreements. Compared to the average for all women as a group, fewer single 
mothers and women with children under the age of three have an operative integration 
agreement. In addition, an above-average number of persons under the age of 25 attend 
training measures and an above-average number of persons over the age of 50 participate in 
employment schemes. 
Equality of opportunity for men and women 
Looking at the overall picture, women in comparison to men almost always exhibit a lesser 
probability of participating in active labour market policy measures. Measures which, all in all, 
are used only very seldomly – such as measures for starting a business – constitute the 
primary exceptions to this. Beyond this, it is striking that single mothers and women with 
children under three years of age participate in labour market policy measures very seldomly. 
In this connection, it is not possible to offer a conclusive answer to the question of whether 
and to what extent this is to be attributed to the easing of the requirement that registered job 
seekers must always be available for placement activities or to a lack of childcare.  
The allocation of training measures to women appears to follow a special pattern whereby 
especially those women who are formally well or highly qualified have greater access to such 
measures. It cannot be determined here whether this is the result of particularly intensive 
efforts to foster women who are re-entering the labour market or whether it should be 
interpreted as mis-allocation. In any event, an examination of the findings on the use of 
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measures can make a substantial contribution to eliminating gender differences. 
Conclusion 
All in all, the studies on the activation process show that the Joint Agencies emphasize 
requiring activity on the part of the job seeker more than Approved Local Providers do. 
However, the models were converging at the end of the period under study. This 
development points to institutional learning (which possibly also induced the 'contest' 
between the provider models) which disseminates successful or simply just common labour 
market strategies among the actors. It may surprise that the intensity of activation is 
generally not increasing. Activation is not however an end in itself. It is also subject to cost-
benefit considerations. This situation might however also have been due to the fact that there 
is an inadequate level of acceptance for and implementation of activation instruments. In the 
area of client management and job-oriented placement, the Joint Agencies mostly follow 
standard processes originating from the Federal Employment Agency. Looking at the degree 
of activation by target group (as a fundamental aspect of client management), the results do 
not show that the bodies responsible for basic security benefits act on a targeted basis at all. 
This impression is even stronger when the data is broken down by sex. 
V. Effects at individual and aggregate level 
The effects of the provider models were always measured on a comparative basis. When it is 
said here that one of the models had a positive or negative effect, this simply means that the 
particular model did better or worse in comparison to the other provider model. It does not 
say anything about the level of effect seen in the provision of basic security benefits as a 
whole. Further, it is not possible to assess the absolute success of the provider models on 
this basis.  
"Who can do it better ... "   
Looking at the individual key target indicators, neither provider model developed a uniform 
effect during the period under examination. This means that both models exhibited 
advantages and disadvantages of varying degree in their effect at individual and aggregate 
level. 
Looking at the total figures for integration into employment – irrespective of the type of 
integration – of individuals who are employable and in need of assistance, significant 
differences could not be observed at individual level between the provider models during the 
period under study. However, the Joint Agencies exhibited advantages at aggregate level. 
Compared to Approved Local Providers, the Joint Agencies were able to score advantages in 
 Page 19 of 30 reducing the need for assistance and integrating individuals into employment that covers 
their financial needs, both in terms of their effects at individual level and at aggregate level. 
The Approved Local Providers performed better at individual level in the area of integration 
into employment that does not cover the individual's financial needs.  
The positive effects that the Joint Agency model has at the individual level in particular in the 
area of reducing the need for assistance and integrating job seekers who are in need of 
assistance into employment that covers their financial needs are highly significant, robust 
and relevant in magnitude: They range between somewhat less than three percentage points 
and slightly more than four percentage points. This means for example that the probability 
that a person who is in need of assistance will no longer be in need of assistance after one 
year with a Joint Agency (measured from October 2006 to October 2007) is an average of 
3.8 percentage points higher than it is for a comparable individual who is employable, in 
need of assistance and registered with an Approved Local Provider. Based on annual outflow 
rates of 22%, this translates into a not unsubstantial plus of more than 18% for the Joint 
Agencies. This positive Joint Agency effect applies for both men and women but, at nearly 
25%, is higher for men. Although Approved Local Providers appear to be better positioned 
that Joint Agencies are with regard to the strategic relevance and structural anchoring of 
gender mainstreaming, this is not consequently reflected in higher rates of outflow from the 
need for assistance among women. The Joint Agency advantage is just as large with more 
than 25% in integration into employment that covers the individual's financial needs among 
men, whereas no difference can be determined among women. Even an examination of 
whether employment is sustained (lasting at least three months) does nothing to change the 
Joint Agencies' greater level of success.  
At the individual level, the likelihood that a person who is in need of assistance and was 
registered with an Approved Local Provider in October 2007 would take up employment that 
did not cover their financial needs was approximately 16% higher. Further, the Approved 
Local Providers are better at labour market level when integration into unsubsidised 
employment (in other words, excluding subsidised employment in the general labour market) 
is considered without distinguishing between employment that covers the individual's 
financial needs and employment that does not cover the individual's financial needs. 
However these advantages are not robust. In other words, they are less firmly supported at 
empirical level than the Joint Agencies' advantages in the above variables. 
In the case of improving employability, Approved Local Providers also perform slightly better 
overall than the Joint Agencies with a slightly significant but relatively stable lead in the 
overall indicator not only at individual level but also when regional aggregates are examined. 
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A breakdown of the overall indicator 'employability' into its individual dimensions shows 
significant positive effects at the Approved Local Providers only for the 'health' dimension 
(improving the general state of health and the physical ability to work). Significant differences 
between Joint Agencies and Approved Local Providers could not be ascertained for the 
dimensions 'training and skills', 'resources for job hunting' or 'social stability'. 
Approved Local Providers therefore use opportunities to reduce the need for assistance by 
getting individuals into employment that generates supplementary earnings more frequently 
than the Joint Agencies do. However, they succeed less often in getting individuals into 
employment that eliminates the need for assistance entirely. Their weak significant 
advantages in the area of employability are possibility a sign that they could achieve more 
sustained integration into employment over the long term. It was not however possible to 
examine this point due to the limited period of time allotted for the study. It must also be 
remembered that the use of the 'employability' indicator broke new methodological ground 
and the findings should consequently be interpreted with care.  
Findings regarding the effects of the Separate Providers are not available since the data set 
is not sufficient for this. For technical reasons, the impact analyses took them into account on 
the Joint Agency side as a rule. When the Separate Providers are not included in the 
analysis, the findings for the Joint Agencies are similar or even better. Consequently there is 
no bias at the expense of the Approved Local Providers when the Separate Providers are 
included in the evaluation on the Joint Agencies' side. 
"... and why?" 
What are the reasons for the effects had by the particular provider model? In order to explain 
the positive effect that the Joint Agency model has on the objective variables 'elimination of 
need for assistance' and 'integration into employment that covers the individual's financial 
needs', several attributes for the organisational and strategic implementation were identified 
which have an a positive or negative influence on integration into employment that covers the 
individual's financial requirement and on elimination of the need for assistance. All-round, 
intensive, activating and qualified management turned out to be particularly advantageous: 
 (1) All-round management: Generalised case management has a positive effect on the 
integration of men and older persons. The result value is not significant for women. In the 
process, integrating placement services – but not the processing of benefits – into case 
management has proven to be an advantage.  
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relationships, for early and extensive initial interviews (including short-notice job offers 
where applicable) and a quick succession of counselling interviews. They also indicate 
that having a large number of employees, particularly for case management, brings 
advantages. 
(3) Activating management: The positive effect of activating management is proven by the 
success had by bodies responsible for basic security benefits that attach great 
importance to childcare, make placement-oriented use of measures and follow a more 
drastic sanction policy (which as a general rule however tends to operate along a low 
baseline). The term 'placement-oriented use of measures' means the use of training 
measures (determining suitability and availability, application coaching, practice work 
situations). Such measures increase the probability that participants take up employment 
by an average of approximately nine percentage points compared to persons who did not 
participate in them. 
 (4) Qualified management: In addition to this, the positive effect of increased administrative 
spending could possibly be interpreted as a sign for the effectiveness of qualified 
management. Increased administrative spending could stand for the hiring of a 
particularly large number of persons or highly experienced or highly qualified persons 
who are correspondingly better paid. Since the analysis already took the effect had by the 
number of personnel via the attribute 'low management ratio' into account, the additional 
effect of administrative spending cannot be attributed to this. The level of qualification 
among the personnel appears to offer a plausible explanation here. 
By contrast, client segmentation (in the Joint Agency model and particularly at Joint Agencies 
under the Federal Employment Agency) and offering a joint employer service with the 
Federal Employment Agency have a negative effect (whereby the latter exhibits a negative 
effect only when the Joint Agencies are compared with one another). Both results are 
significant for women. This clearly points to selection processes that are currently coupled 
with a marked gender bias at the expense of women. The findings regarding the joint 
employer services that are provided together with the Federal Employment Agency possibly 
demonstrate a selection effect that goes to the disadvantage of unemployed persons who fall 
under SGB II. The effect from being managed by a body that is responsible for basic security 
benefits and whose executive management attaches great importance to cutting costs is 
particularly negative for women.  
 Page 22 of 30 Effects could not be ascertained for flanking benefits and services or for integration 
agreements in the form in which they are currently being implemented. However an 
individual's chances of being integrated into employment that meets his/her financial needs 
increases when the experience gathered in connection with previous integration agreements 
is taken into account when a new agreement is signed (compared to new agreements that do 
not take such experience into account). Further, it was not possible to show an effect for 
participation in special subsidised employment arrangements or advanced training 
programmes lasting up to three months. Moreover, looking at the use of measures in the 
integration process, it was determined that the allocation of measures – in other words, the 
way participants are assigned to the measures examined here (special subsidised 
employment arrangements, advanced training last up to three months and training 
measures) is not optimal. The allocation system is not any more efficient than a random 
allocation. Given the time and cost-intensive use of client segmentation processes and 
integration strategies at the bodies responsible for basic security benefits, this can be 
considered a disappointing finding. Consequently the internal management system has room 
for improvement with regard to effect and economic efficiency. It should be possible to 
generate a better outcome with the same financial resources. 
These general factors behind success and failure cannot however fully explain the lead that 
the Joint Agencies have in the above-mentioned indicators. The reason: Success factors can 
be observed at both Joint Agencies and Approved Local Providers, even though they 
typically exhibit different areas of emphasis. Joint Agencies have advantages arising from the 
activation strategies they pursue (early initial interviews, more frequent use of sanctions, 
activities to foster employment on the general labour market which meets the individual's 
financial needs) while the Approved Local Providers more frequently choose the more 
efficient organisational structure (generalised case management), conduct longer initial 
interviews and attach great importance to childcare. Since both provider models exhibit 
strengths and weaknesses in the day-to-day implementation of their work, these attributes 
cannot completely explain the differences seen in the success levels reported by Joint 
Agencies and Approved Local Providers. To be more precise, other attributes that are typical 
of and innate to the respective provider model have to be responsible for these differences. 
The effect of such attributes is referred to here as the intrinsic model effect. 
An intrinsic model effect exists when an analysis of objective indicators reveals differences in 
effectiveness between bodies that are responsible for basic security benefits and have 
identical structures and strategies but come from different provider models. Consequently 
this type of model effect also indicates that in addition to the already mentioned 
implementation attributes there must also be other differences between the provider models 
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are inextricably linked with the particular provider model and therefore cannot be measured 
independently of but rather only in conjunction with the global attribute 'provider model'. As a 
result of this effect, the second part of the research question – the 'why' – cannot be 
answered unequivocally. Based on the empirical findings from the four areas to be examined 
in these studies, only theoretically plausible observations can be made: "Which attributes 
distinguish Joint Agencies – independently of the organisational structures and activation 
strategies that have already been taken into account – from Approved Local Providers? And 
which of these attributes appears to be suited for explaining the substantial difference in 
performance?" The reason: The individual model itself cannot generate an effect simply on 
the grounds of its particular designation.  
Hypotheses for explaining the intrinsic model effect 
The above questions can be answered only on the basis of theoretical observations or 
hypotheses. Hypotheses must however exhibit a measure of plausibility and should not be 
arbitrarily chosen. The findings from the results of the individual areas examined can be used 
in part for assessing the plausibility of possible explanations. 
Generally speaking, given the sizable number of estimates made which have taken a large 
number of relevant variables into account, there are scarcely any variables remaining that 
could possibly trigger the intrinsic model effect.  
At most, the variables 'the SGB II unit's access to jobs that are registered with the Federal 
Employment Agency' and 'the Federal Employment Agency's access to jobs that are 
registered with the SGB II unit' – which are primarily Joint Agency attributes – could be 
discussed in this connection. These variables in themselves do not have a significant effect 
on outflows from the need for assistance or on integration into gainful employment. Given 
that these two variables usually appear together in day-to-day implementation, one 
conceivable hypothesis would be that an estimate of the simultaneous interaction between 
the two could produce a significant value. This would however be very unlikely and was 
consequently not examined here. It can be virtually ruled out that the intrinsic model effect 
would be reduced in quantitative terms in such an estimate because the cited results were 
mainly taken from a comparison of Joint Agencies. This is because reciprocal access to 
registered jobs is by definition to be primarily observed among Joint Agencies.   
So what would be plausible hypotheses for explaining the intrinsic model effect? The intrinsic 
model effect could, for example, be explained by the different traditional cultures and 
normative orientations that exist in the labour and social services administrations. Put in 
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tends to be geared to matching and placing and, on the other hand, the municipalities' labour 
market strategy which tends to take its lead from welfare principles. The fact that Approved 
Local Providers apparently work less than Joint Agencies toward ensuring that clients take 
up employment that meets their financial needs says something for this explanatory model. 
Another fact that speaks in favour of this hypothesis is that an intrinsic model effect can also 
be observed in connection with improvement in employability – albeit this time among the 
Approved Local Providers, whereby the effect here is less pronounced than it is in the 
elimination of the need for assistance. This can be viewed as a further sign for a distinctive 
normative orientation among the staff at Approved Local Providers which can be explained 
by a strategy that tends to be geared to successfully placing clients on a long-term basis. 
The question of if and to what extent such a strategy – when it exists – works and whether 
the long-term results justify foregoing the use of placement opportunities that evidently 
become available at short notice. 
It can however be assumed that there are concrete operationalisable effect channels – such 
as the personnel structure – behind the rather wholesale explanatory factors 'culture' and 
'normative orientation': All provider models hire personnel for limited periods of time. 
However, the Approved Local Providers hire more individuals on this basis. As the analyses 
show, this does not however cause differences in effect. Alternatively, the different levels of 
prior experience among the personnel could possibly play a role: In contrast to the Joint 
Agencies which drew a large portion of their personnel from the staff at the respective local 
employment offices and welfare offices, the Approved Local Providers recruit a large share of 
their personnel from the labour market. However, it was not possible to prove that the 
personnel's prior experience with placement and guidance work had any influence on the 
success of the bodies responsible for basic security benefits – and this is also not 
necessarily connected with a particular recruiting channel.  
Furthermore, it could be assumed that the different training profiles of the persons working in 
the respective provider models play a role. Approved Local Providers have a markedly larger 
share of employees who have pedagogical training than the Joint Agencies do. At the same 
time, the share of personnel with administrative training is markedly smaller. Direct findings 
regarding the effects had by personnel structure (and the concomitant activation culture) are 
not however available. At most, the large share of personnel who have pedagogical training 
could be attributed to specific implementation strategies – such as generalised case 
management. Empirical findings show that generalised case management is however 
superior to specialised case management. In this respect, personnel structure cannot explain 
why the Approved Local Providers did worse here than the Joint Agencies. 
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model effect is based on the assumption that the constitutive quality of the Joint Agency 
model – in other words, the institutionalised linking of placement expertise with the local 
provision of services and benefits – generates synergies in the area of integration into the 
labour market. The implementation and governance analyses have shown that the 
availability of local services and benefits at Joint Agencies is no less than it is at Approved 
Local Providers. In other words, Joint Agencies do not trail the Approved Local Providers on 
this point. They might however be able to additionally profit from their greater placement 
expertise; this advantage would overcompensate for the higher co-ordination costs that are 
inherent in the Joint Agency system. Although the research consortium's empirical findings 
do not provide any direct basis for this hypothesis, they do not disprove it either. However 
should this hypothesis be correct and the transaction costs for the greater need for co-
ordination fall further over the course of time, the Joint Agencies' efficiency could increase in 
the future. 
The following hypothesis also appears to be worth discussing supplementary to and in 
conjunction with the above statements: The studies suggest that centralised or supra-
regional management by objectives (instructions regarding what is to be achieved) on the 
part of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Federal Employment Agency 
possibly has a positive effect. The reason: The Joint Agencies differ decidedly from the 
Approved Local Providers in this connection and comparative efficiency reviews probably 
foster activation intensity. The studies clearly show how much the Federal Employment 
Agency's monitoring and controlling activities shape the daily work routine at the Joint 
Agencies. The Approved Local Providers are subject to a much lesser degree or not at all to 
this type of supra-regional management by objectives. On the other hand, the requirements 
and targets stipulated by county and district authorities generate pressure to post labour 
market policy success. Looking at the intensity of centralised management (by objectives), 
there are glaring differences between Joint Agencies and Approved Local Providers that are 
directly connected with the respective provider model.  
A positive effect from centralised management by rules (instructions regarding what is to be 
done) could also be assumed since the provider models exhibit marked differences here as 
well. The regulations and administrative provisions concerning structures, strategies and 
processes to which Joint Agencies are subject from the Federal Employment Agency are 
stricter than those the Approved Local Providers must follow. As expected, a markedly larger 
number of respondents at Approved Local Providers than their counterparts at the Joint 
Agencies also said that they had sufficient or sizable latitude in their work. There are 
however findings on the question of centralised management by rules which do not exactly 
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Agency's client segmentation (a joint employer service with the Federal Employment Agency) 
which indicate that measures are being allocated on a sub-optimal basis and reveal a lack of 
effect on the part of integration agreements (in their current form), special subsidised 
employment arrangements and further training courses with a duration of up to three months. 
This precludes an assessment of the effect of centralised management by rules here. 
The Approved Local Providers' positive effect on employability also constitutes an intrinsic 
model effect which cannot be explained by organisational structures or activation strategies. 
The reason: A significant effect on the overall indicator 'employability' cannot be determined 
for Approved Local Providers, with the exception of a slightly significant negative effect in the 
integration of benefits' processing in the case management of persons over the age of 50. 
Further, the number of employees working in the case management system has a generally 
positive effect at individual level on the employability of persons who are in need of 
assistance.  
An examination of the individual indicators reveals more pronounced effects for organisation 
and strategy variables as well. For instance, the integration of benefits' processing into case 
management has a negative effect on 'improving qualifications and skills' and 'improving 
health'. Looking at bodies that are responsible for basic security benefits, women who are 
registered with those bodies whose executive management reports that they attach great 
importance to addiction, debt and psycho-social guidance services benefit in terms of an 
improvement in the general state of their health or physical ability to work (significant), their 
qualifications and skills (significant) and their social stability (slightly significant). Since the 
provider models do not however exhibit any fundamental differences in these factors, this 
cannot be used to explain the advantage that the Approved Local Provider model displays 
here. Instead, the tradition of the earlier welfare offices – which was oriented more to 
providing social assistance and less toward placement – which is reflected in the Approved 
Local Provider model could also offer an explanation here. 
Interim conclusion 
In summary, the different strategies pursued by the Joint Agencies and the Approved Local 
Providers and their effects can be interpreted as follows: Joint Agencies activate more 
quickly and with a stronger focus on placement; they pay attention to integrating their clients 
first and foremost into employment that covers the individual's financial needs. Through their 
use of sanctions they boost the willingness of persons who are in need of assistance to play 
an active role and to make concessions. However they also make greater use of wage 
subsidies for integration purposes. Approved Local Providers subsidise the commencement 
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more frequently. On the whole they pursue a strategy of social integration (which also 
includes fostering employability) which is influenced by the case management approach 
which in turn comes from the social assistance tradition. However this strategy possibly 
activates to a lesser degree personal initiative on the part of persons who are in need of 
assistance and, as a result, misses employment opportunities. 
Thus all in all, requiring involvement and action on the part of the recipients – and not so 
much the provision of assistance – apparently makes the difference. 'Requiring' in this 
connection however does not mean just making demands. It also means preventing 
resignation from setting in and opening up new prospects that individual might not have 
noticed or seized had there been no activation that required the individual to participate or 
take action. For example, persistently requiring a client who has already given up hope of 
ever finding a job to continue to apply regularly for jobs makes it clear that it is not a pointless 
undertaking but rather constitutes a chance to end his or her need for assistance. This 
chance must however also be realistic and must be put across credibly so that the client 
continues to make serious efforts and sees the sense in the demands being placed on 
him/her. Placing demands on the client thus appears to work when it opens up options for 
the client. Options are therefore the quid pro quo that the activating state has to deliver in 
return for co-operation on the part of the individual who is in need of assistance. 
Income opportunities and fiscal efficiency 
The analyses of income opportunities and fiscal efficiency are partly based on the findings 
from the macro-analysis of transitions from one status to another (employment that is subject 
to compulsory social insurance contributions, marginal part-time employment, unemployment 
the falls under SGB III, unemployment that falls under SGB II). The number of dismissals and 
resignations were also taken into account in this connection. This figure in itself can also be 
interpreted as an indicator for the sustainability of integration or for possible displacements 
arising from the integration of unemployed persons into employment. It turns out here that 
the percentage share of employed persons who are subject to compulsory social insurance 
contributions and who transit to unemployment that falls under SGB III is significantly smaller 
in regions with Approved Local Providers but that inflows into unemployment under SGB II 
are (somewhat significantly) higher in such regions. Both effects however disappear when 
further attributes are considered. It also turns out that regions where the bodies that are 
responsible for basic security benefits have not integrated the placement of unemployed 
clients into the general labour market into their case management system exhibit higher 
outflows from employment that is subject to compulsory social security contributions into 
unemployment that falls under SGB III. 
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measure of the so-called income prospects of an average employable individual who is in 
need of assistance. This measure was designed to illustrate the individual value of persons 
who are in need of assistance. Here the average income of the different statuses 
(employment that is subject to compulsory social insurance contributions, marginal part-time 
employment, unemployment the falls under SGB III, unemployment that falls under SGB II) is 
weighted with the probability of making the transition to one of these statuses. Since there is 
a greater probability of making the transition to employment that is subject to compulsory 
social insurance contributions or to marginal part-time employment, employable persons who 
are in need of assistance and are managed by Joint Agencies with their de facto concomitant 
organisational structures and activation strategies had higher anticipated incomes over all 
the months observed than persons who are managed by Approved Local Providers did. 
In the area of fiscal efficiency, it was possible to determine in general at individual level in the 
provider models that in comparison to the half of the bodies that are responsible for basic 
security benefits which has a smaller stock of persons in need of assistance per specialist, 
the other half – which has a larger stock of persons in need of assistance per specialist – 
posts a fiscal loss of approximately € 75 per month and household in which the jobless 
person lives due to its poorer performance in integrating clients into the labour market. As a 
model, Approved Local Providers generate a fiscal loss averaging some € 63 per month and 
household in which the jobless person lives (with a range of variation of approximately € 33 
to approximately € 94) due to the above-outlined negative effects (in comparison to the Joint 
Agencies) in the area of placement in employment that covers the individual's financial 
needs. This examination includes the total costs arising in connection with the provision of 
basic security benefits (passive and active benefits, administrative costs) and, on the utility 
side, the savings in long-term unemployment compensation (Unemployment Benefits II) plus 
the additional tax revenues and insurance contributions. It must however be taken into 
account that the calculation of fiscal efficiency at individual level could include only the 
complete elimination of the need for assistance – but not the effects of a reduction in the 
need for assistance. 
By contrast, not only the elimination of the need for assistance but also the reduction of the 
need for assistance could be taken into account in the analyses of fiscal efficiency at macro-
level described in the following section. The savings that would theoretically arise were the 
Joint Agency model to be implemented nationwide (in comparison to a nationwide 
implementation of the Approved Local Provider model) were estimated at macro-economic 
level on the basis of the analyses during the period under study to be € 3.3 billion per year. 
The estimated fiscal effects consist of € 0.5 billion in additional income tax receipts, € 1.9 
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basic security benefits and less assistance for housing and heating would have to be 
disbursed and € 0.1 billion in savings in expenditure on integration benefits and services and 
in administrative costs. These economies could be explained almost entirely by the 
difference in the number of persons in employment that is subject to compulsory social 
insurance contributions. Consequently, nearly 60% of these savings (in the form of additional 
receipts) would accrue to the social insurance bodies (where more than 90% would go to 
statutory pension insurance and statutory health insurance). 
Due to chance fluctuations in this estimate, this figure can only be seen as an approximate 
reference value and should therefore only be used with great care. The simulation is based 
on the critical assumption that the effects that were ascertained can be applied nationwide to 
all bodies that are responsible for basic security benefits. A direct influence on the part of the 
provider models was not substantiated primarily with respect to the estimate of the 
employment trend at regional level which provides the basis for this simulation. 
Since, as explained above, it appears that it is also the actual implementation and not just 
the provider model in and of itself that is important, it is to be assumed that savings could 
also be achieved if the provider models were left untouched and the Approved Local 
Providers just incorporated the positive aspects of the Joint Agencies' implementation 
practice. However there is much that indicates that certain advantageous factors are 
systematically linked with the Joint Agency model and would not be easy to apply elsewhere: 
This particularly applies to those factors that were discussed above under the keyword 
'intrinsic model effect'. Furthermore, even greater savings could be achieved when all bodies 
responsible for basic security benefits were to adopt those organisational structures and 
activation strategies that the analyses indicated were generally the most effective. 
Conclusion 
The overall picture shows that there are possibilities in many areas for improving and refining 
the implementation of the provision of basic security benefits for job seekers. The findings 
from the evaluation conducted pursuant to Section 6c of SGB II thus constitute important 
inputs for the institutional learning process envisaged by the law-makers. The above findings 
should not however be interpreted as a call to centralise the basic security benefits system. 
Rather, the 'contest' initiated by Section 6a of SGB II has led to insights and findings which 
could never have been attained had SGB II been implemented using the same system 
nationwide. Competition between different approaches can thus contribute to the progressive 
development of the provision of basic security benefits but – and this is crucial – only when it 
is based on transparency and verifiability. A system that allows local latitude within the scope 
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system which can and does allow changes in the course it is pursuing when the targeted 
goals are not met appears to be the most promising for improving the chances of employable 
individuals who are in need of assistance. 
 
